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Category: State Sentencing

U.S. Supreme Court Will Review the Problematic Separate Sovereigns Exception

Posted By admin 2018-07-10 20:48:09

The United States Supreme Court agreed recently to consider whether to overturn a longstanding rule that allows federal and state prosecutions for the same offense. The cert petition filed on behalf of Terrance Gamble was granted, allowing the Court to decide “[w]hether the Supreme Court should overrule the ‘separate sovereigns’ exception to the double jeopardy clause.”

Mr. Gamble is challenging his prosecution by federal officials for possessing a firearm as a felon after Alabama state had already convicted and sentenced him for the same offense. The Double Jeopardy Clause forbids the government from prosecuting a person more than once for the same offense, but courts have long held that this only bars reprosectution by the same sovereign. Put simply, under what is known as the “separate sovereign” exception, the federal government may reprosecute a person after a state prosecution (and vice versa). A defendant can therefore be prosecuted by both the state government and the federal government for the same offense.

My firm in Los Angeles practices criminal law at both the state and federal levels, giving me a unique opportunity to observe how the separate sovereigns exception is applied in California. I have noticed (and been disturbed by) duplicative federal-state prosecutions becoming increasingly common. This trend is in part because of the growing scope of federal criminal law. In addition, I think that states are benefiting from the exception to help fill investigative gaps, or refine legal arguments, that led to exoneration at the federal level. (The same goes for the federal government). Furthermore, the separate sovereigns exceptions appears to be applied more frequently in high profile cases, and/or cases involving serious charges that carry serious social stigma. For instance, the Justice Department recently brought charges against alleged Charlottesville attacker James Fields Jr., who is already awaiting a state trial in Virginia.

Mr. Gamble’s case is instructive on why the separate sovereigns exception raises serious constitutional issues and is ripe for challenge. For defendants like Mr. Gamble, the separate sovereigns exception can result in a lengthier time in custody. As a result of the duplicative conviction, Mr. Gamble must spend an additional three years of his life behind bars. This result is incompatible with the text of the Double Jeopardy Clause, and with the original purpose of the Clause and federalism more broadly. As Mr. Gamble’s petition for a write of certiorari explains:

The court-manufactured “separate sovereigns” exception— pursuant to which [Mr. Gamble’s] otherwise plainly unconstitutional duplicative conviction was upheld— is inconsistent with the plain text and original meaning of the Constitution, and outdated in light of incorporation and a vastly expanded system of federal criminal law.

I agree with Mr. Gamble’s position. The purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause is that the State, with all its resources and power, should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to stigma, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity. The separate-sovereigns exception cannot be reconciled with this purpose.

That the separate sovereign exception has drawn scrutiny from liberal and conservative justices alike points to its fundamental unfairness. UCLA law professor Eugene Volokh noted that both Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Clarence Thomas recently questioned the doctrine’s viability. While I am disturbed that the separate sovereigns exception is being applied more readily, I am optimistic that the Supreme Court will find that the exception cannot be squared with the Double Jeopardy Clause and should no longer apply.

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U.S. Supreme Court Finds that a Crime-based Removal Provision is Unconstitutionally Vague

Posted By admin 2018-04-23 01:30:28

In California, defense lawyers have a legal and ethical duty to advise clients on their criminal cases’ immigration consequences. This duty is extremely important because a criminal conviction can result in deportation, even for an immigrant who has lived and worked legally in the United States for decades. In light of the Trump administration’s emphasis on the removal of “criminal aliens,” we are seeing an increase in litigation of criminal removal cases, and gaining clarity in this complex area of the law.

As a criminal defense lawyer working in Los Angeles, I represent many clients whose immigration status is threatened by their criminal charges. This is why I am passionate about following developments in criminal-removal cases, and am particularly excited about a U.S. Supreme Court case decided this week called Sessions v. Dimaya. The Dimaya case involved a constitutional challenge to a criminal-removal provision in the immigration laws, which historically have been almost wholly immune from judicial review.

The defendant, James Dimaya, challenged the constitutionality of a provision in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) allowing for deportation for aggravated felonies involving “crimes of violence.” An immigrant convicted of an “aggravated felony” under 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(43) is subject to mandatory removal and is ineligible for most forms of relief from removal. The definition of “aggravated felony” incorporates by reference 18 U.S.C. §16(b). Section 16(b) defines a “crime of violence” to encompass “any … offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” What constitutes a felony involving a “crime of violence” is a murky legal issue that courts have interpreted differently. The result is an unpredictable and counterintuitive body of law.

For example, Mr. Dimaya,had two residential burglary convictions, neither of which involved violence. He was charged under California statute, which defines residential burglary so broadly that it could cover dishonest door-to-door salespeople.

Is a burglary a “crime of violence” when it need not entail any actual violence? Immigration judges held that it was, and that Dimaya’s convictions fell within the “residual clause” of the definition of a violent crime. This allowed Mr. Dimaya’s deportation to move forward. Mr. Dimaya appealed, challenging the constitutionality of this “residual clause.” He argued that the provision is too vague to comport with the Due Process Clause, which guarantees that ordinary people have fair notice of the conduct a law prohibits. The 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, holding that the residual clause violated due process.

The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the 9th Circuit’s ruling that Section 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague. The Court noted that to determine whether a person’s conduct falls within the ambit of Section 16(b), “courts use a distinctive form of what we have called the categorical approach.” Rather than assessing whether the particular facts of someone’s conduct pose the substantial risk required under the statute, courts consider the overall nature of the offense, and ask “whether ‘the ordinary case’ of an offense poses the requisite risk.” Defining the “ordinary case” under the “crime of violence” provision poses vagueness and due process problems, including unpredictability and arbitrariness. Mr. Dimaya’s case is illustrative. It defies logic that Mr. Dimaya could be deported for committing a so-called “crime of violence” when the crimes he was convicted of involved no violence.

The Court’s finding that this residual clause deprives immigrants of fair notice as to what qualifies as a “crime of violence” will create more uniform, predicable law. In reaching its decision, the Court pointed to judicial disagreement over what crimes count: Some federal appeals courts have found that car burglary, statutory rape, evading arrest, residential trespass, unauthorized use of a vehicle, stalking, and firearms possessions are crimes of violence. Other appeals courts have reached opposite conclusions. This made it difficult to provide concrete legal advice to clients on how certain outcomes to their criminal cases could affect their immigration status.

Sessions v. Dimaya is beneficial to non-United States citizens who are facing felony charges in the United States for non-violent acts. Such individuals should seek representation from a criminal lawyer who is well-versed in the recent changes to criminal removal case law.

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California’s Amended Firearm Use Enhancements Open a Door for Skillful Advocacy

Posted By admin 2018-03-29 20:08:21

Californians are no longer subject to a mandatory sentence enhancement for use of a firearm while committing or attempting to commit a felony under state law. Senate Bill 620, effective as of January 1, 2018, amended section 12022.53(h) of the Penal Code of California to make firearm use enhancement discretionary. A state court judge in California may strike or dismiss a firearm use enhancement if doing so would be in the interest of justice. This stands in contrast to federal law, which still requires a mandatory-minimum prison term for possessing a gun during commission of a drug offense or a violent crime.

In California, it is more important than ever for a person charged with a felony involving a firearm to retain an attorney who has specialized knowledge of firearm use enhancements. Defendants and their attorneys now have an opportunity to persuade state courts against imposing the firearm use enhancement. This even includes some cases where firearms enhancements have been ordered. The California Court of Appeal for the Second District just ruled this month in Almanza that the amendment applies retroactively to benefit defendants whose cases were on appeal when the law changed.

Before the amendment, Penal Code 12022.53 automatically added to a sentence for certain violent felonies 10 years’ jail for “using” a gun, 20 years’ jail for firing a gun, or 25 years’ jail to a life sentence for killing or seriously injuring another person with a gun. For remaining felonies, individuals who personally used a firearm or assault weapon in the commission of a crime were automatically subject to an additional and consecutive prison term of 3, 4, or 10 years for a firearm, or 5, 6 or 10 years for an assault weapon. It is laudable and sensible that firearms enhancements are no longer automatic.

In California, mandatory firearms enhancements resulted in countless unreasonably high sentences, especially in cases where the firearms were not operable or loaded. The social costs of mandatory firearms enhancements outweighed any purported public safety benefit. In debate about Senate Bill 620, Californians for Safety and Justice presented research to the Senate showing that firearms enhancements disproportionately increased racial disparities in California’s prison populations, and greatly increased the population of incarcerated persons, without deterring crime.

As a defense attorney in Los Angeles who specializes in violent crimes, I also saw firsthand how firearms enhancements affect people already serving their sentences. Enhanced sentences served for firearms use are sometimes the only obstacle to early parole for some persons under Proposition 57. For example, an individual convicted of assault with a firearm on a peace officer may be subject to an additional term under Penal Code section 12022.53. Any violation of PC 12022.53 is deemed a violent felony under PC 667.5(c), which makes that individual ineligible for early parole consideration under Proposition 57. However, without the additional term under PC 12022.53, that same offender would be eligible for early parole under Proposition 57 because assault with a firearm on a peace officer is not a violent felony under Penal Code section 667.5(c).

Discretionary firearm enhancements allow courts to tailor sentences to each case and offender. However, it is likely that firearm use enhancements will continue to be imposed in many-if not most-state felonies where firearms are used. One reason is that courts will carefully examine the aggravating features of cases involving firearms to decide what enhancements should apply. For instance, in Almanza, the Court decided not to remand the case to trial court to reconsider imposing a lower sentence without firearm enhancements in part because of the case’s egregious facts.

Defense lawyers must respond by taking a meticulous approach to trial advocacy, which includes putting on the record all mitigating factors in their cases that would weigh in favour of striking firearms enhancements. This includes thinking ahead to how firearms enhancements affect parole eligibility. Such submissions are crucial to persuade a trial judge to strike or dismiss a firearms use enhancement, as well as to protect the record for appeal.

The changes to section 12022.53 create room for defense attorneys to advocate for lower, more reasonable sentences for their clients. Individuals charged with felonies involving firearms should look for a lawyer who has a technical understanding of firearms enhancements, preferably under both state and federal law. Courts will be listening closely to defense attorneys’ submissions against firearms enhancements, and attorneys must be prepared at all stages of litigation to address how firearms enhancements affect several dimensions of a criminal case.

Karen L. Goldstein specializes in state and federal violent crimes as well as felonies where firearms are typically used, such as drug offenses. Please call (888) 445-6313 for more information.

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